Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action," the trial judge shall determine whether
the suit should be allowed to continue as a class action.1 In practice, however, the period between filing and the decision on class
certification can be rather long-often more than six months.2
During this delay the statute of limitations may expire. Whether
asserted class members are barred by the statute of limitations in
these circumstances is a question that has troubled many courts.
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,' the Supreme
Court held that in cases where the class subsequently is certified,
the class members should be deemed to have been "in court" from
the date of the filing of the class action.4 Should class action status
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). Rule 23 specifies the criteria the trial court should consider:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of its members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
In addition to these requirements, rule 23(b) sets forth the possible grounds for justifying
the use of a class action: (1) the question involved must be resolved by a single suit, because
there is a danger that absent parties' rights could be effectively disposed of, or that the
defendant could be subjected to inconsistent obligations; (2) classwide declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate; or (3) a class action is superior to all other available methods of
resolving the disputes.
' See Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123,
1141-43 (1974) (six months as average time between filing and motion for certification).
There is a delay between the original filing of the suit and the motion by a party either to
grant or to deny class action status, and there is a further delay while the court considers
the motion.
3 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
" Id. at 545-52. The Court reasoned that such a tolling rule was vital to the preservation
of the class action device:
[Not to toll for class members] would frustrate the principal function of a class suit,
because then the sole means by which members of the class could assure their participation in the judgment if notice of the class suit did not reach them until after the
- running of the limitation period would be to file earlier individual motions to join or
intervene as parties-precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was designed
to avoid in those cases where a class action is found "superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
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be denied, however, the position of the asserted class members is
problematic. The Supreme Court in American Pipe provided
guidelines for answering this question, 5 but they have proved unclear and difficult to apply.
This comment seeks to clarify the position of asserted class
members when class certification is denied after the running of the
statute of limitations. Three areas of controversy will be explored.
The comment will first examine the scope of the American Pipe
tolling rule, and the difficulties of satisfying its dual goals as those
goals currently are interpreted by the lower courts. Problems in
the Court's prescribed method of tolling a statute of limitations
will then be discussed. Finally, the comment will deal with the controversy over available methods of claiming tolling benefits under
American Pipe.
I. American Pipe
In 1969 the state of Utah filed an antitrust class suit, charging
a price-fixing conspiracy among manufacturers and distributors of
concrete and steel pipe in the western United States. The suit was
Id. at 551 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
In discussing suits granted class certification after the running of the statutory period,
the Court devoted much of its attention to distinguishing current class action procedure
from that employed before the 1966 amendments. Prior to 1966, class actions were of three
types: true, hybrid, and spurious, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 94-95
(1966). A class member in a spurious class action had the power of "one-way intervention":
if the representative was successful, class members could then intervene and share in the
favorable judgment; if the representative lost, class members were not bound by the judgment and could sue individually. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction of
the Class Suit, 8 U. CHL L. REv. 684 (1941). This aspect of spurious class actions led to a
disagreement among the courts over the effect of the filing of a class claim on the statute of
limitations for absent class members. The majority of courts emphasized the representative
nature of the class suit, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965), or desired to protect the absent class members' ability to rely
on the class suit and benefit by it, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d
561, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); York v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Other
courts emphasized the unfairness of one-way intervention and declared that the spurious
class action was nothing more than a "permissive joinder device" for essentially separate
claims, e.g., Athas v. Day, 161 F. Supp. 916, 919 (D. Colo. 1958); see Comment, Class Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of Limitations: A Study of Conflicting
Rationale, 13 VIL. L. REv. 370, 378-80 (1968). Hence, they concluded, each class member
must individually satisfy the statute of limitations. The American Pipe court declared that
the unfairness of one-way intervention had been removed from the amended rule 23, and
thus treatment of a class suit as a "permissive joinder device" was no longer justified. 414
U.S. at 550.
5 414 U.S. at 552-56.
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brought on behalf of public agencies in Utah, and on behalf of
other state agencies in the western area who were end users of concrete and steel pipe. Utah had filed the action with eleven days left
to run in the statutory period. Eighteen months later the defendants moved, pursuant to rule 23(c)(1), 7 for an order declaring that

the suit could not be maintained as a class action. The district
judge granted the motion, holding that while the complaint alleged
a class of more than 800 members, he knew "[f]rom prior actual

experience . . . involving the same alleged conspiracy" 8 that the

actual number of public agencies that might have been injured by
the alleged conspiracy was much smaller. The judge thus ruled
that the class was not so numerous as to make joinder of all class
members impracticable, as is required by rule 23(a)(1), 9 and he denied class certification. 10 Eight days after the entry of that order,
more than sixty towns, municipalities, and water districts moved
to intervene in the suit. The trial court denied the motions on the
ground that the statute of limitations had run.1"
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "as to members of
the class Utah purported to represent ... suit was actually commenced by Utah's filing. '12 The court emphasized that when the

trial court denied class action status because the class was not so
numerous as to make joinder impracticable, it was simply expressing a preference that the suit should take a different form-a
joint suit instead of a class action. The intervenors were merely
attempting to comply with the trial court's wish.13
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, but offered
a different and more thorough analysis of the general problem that
arises when class status is denied after the running of the statutory
period.14 This analysis centered on two considerations.
The first consideration was the protection of the class action
device. The Court characterized the trial court's denial of class certification as a decision based on "subtle factors," not easily fore6 See id. at 542.

R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
6 Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17, 21 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The same
7 FED.

judge had presided over similar civil antitrust suits brought by other state governments. See

id. at 18-19.
9 See note 1 supra.
10 49 F.R.D. at 21.
' Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
12 Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1973).
13 Id. at 583-84.
14 414 U.S. at 552-56.
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seen by class members.1 5 If these class members were not protected
from the statute of limitations after such a denial of class action
status, great harm to the class action procedure would result.1 "
"Potential class members would be induced to file protective motions to intervene or join in the event that a class was later found
unsuitable. ' 17 This "multiplicity of activity," the Court said, was
precisely what many class actions were designed to prevent. 8
The Court's second consideration involved one of the basic
reasons for having a statute of limitations, the concept that a potential defendant should have timely notice of any action brought
against him. The claim of the named plaintiff in American Pipe
was sufficiently typical of the class claims to ensure that the
defendant had received adequate notice, within the statutory period, of the claims against him. 19 The Court thus reasoned that its
decision to toll honored the notice rationale underlying the limitations requirement.
The analytical framework derived from these two considerations has been aimed at protecting both the vitality of the class
action suit from a needless "multiplicity of activity," and the integrity of the notice requirement underlying any statute of limitations. The lower courts, however, have had difficulty applying this
framework and have reached inconsistent results in several important respects.
Is Id. at

553.

I Id.
" Id.
' Id. at 551. When the Court used this language, it was discussing the problem of class
suits that are granted class action status after the running of the statutory period. See note
4 supra. The Court applied this same rationale two pages later, 414 U.S. at 553, when it
discussed class suits denied certification after the running of the statutory period.
" 414 U.S. at 554-55. The Court based its analysis of the notice given to the defendant
on the trial court's determination of class certification questions. Because the trial court
determined that the named plaintiff's claim was typical of the class, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3),
and that he would adequately represent the interests of the class, id. 23(a)(4); see note 1
supra, the Court concluded that the defendant had received adequate notice for purposes of
the statute of limitations. Whether the Court thought the reverse would also be true-that
the defendant could not be considered to have received adequate notice if the representative
had not satisfied those class action requirements-is not clear from the opinion.
When the Court held that class members are protected when a class action is granted
class certification after the running of the statue of limitations, it did not discuss the question of notice. That is explained, however, by the Court's analysis of the notice question
when class suits are denied certification after the running of the statute. When certification
is granted, the requirements of typicality and adequate representation must have been
satisified. Thus the defendant must be considered to have received adequate notice in any
class suit that is granted class certification.
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THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE TOLLING RULE

The first difficulty courts have faced in applying American
Pipe concerns when this tolling rule should be applied. Two approaches have been used, and neither is consistent with the entire
rationale of American Pipe.
A. Emphasis on the Class Action
One approach concentrates solely on the first consideration of
American Pipe: the protection of the class action device. If the
reason for denial of class certification in the present suit was based
on sufficiently subtle factors, the courts must toll the running of
the statute of limitations for all asserted class members.20 A refusal
to toll after such an unpredictable denial of class certification
might spawn a multiplicity of motions by anxious class members in
future suits. Many courts have read American Pipe even more
broadly, believing that the courts must always toll for asserted
class members; the reason for denial of class certification, and the
subtlety of the factors leading to that decision, would be irrelevant.2 These courts ignore the possibility that the defendant received no notice of the claims presented by subsequent plaintiffs
claiming tolling benefits of the class suit, and thus they disregard
the second consideration of American Pipe.22
20 Goldstein

v. Regal Crest, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571, 576-80 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 1318, 1449 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Class Actions].
21 Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 578 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1978); Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.23 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 929 (1976); Peritz
v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
496 F.2d 747, 760-61 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974); Parker v. Bell
Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 513 & n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Agostine v. Sidcon Corp., 69
F.R.D. 437, 448 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64
F.R.D. 586, 590 & n.6 (D. Md. 1974); Morton v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 373 F. Supp.
394, 396 (D. Md. 1974), afl'd, 520 F.2d 871 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1975).
This may be the more sensible application of American Pipe, although it is not faithful
to the actual reasoning of the case. If one of the purposes of class suits is that class members
may wait passively, relying on their champion, it seems inconsistent to require class members to be aware of "unsubtle factors."
22 Admittedly, in many of these cases such a question may not have been presented by
the defendant, or it may have been obviated because it was clear to all that the defendant
must have received notice. Indeed, this comment argues, see text and notes at notes 36-39
infra, that in most cases it will be obvious that the defendant received notice of the plaintiff's claim. Courts also have interpreted American Pipe in this way in situations where the
adequacy of notice would be in serious doubt, however. See Miller v. Central Chinchilla
Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 411, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (certification denied because common questions did not predominate); Jones v. Holy Cross Hosp. Silver Spring, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 586, 590
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The American Pipe Court clearly recognized that the basic
policies of the statute of limitations must be satisfied before tolling
benefits may be granted. 23 The Court also recognized timely notice
to the defendant as one of those basic policies. Because "evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared, '25 the defendant is prejudiced by the plaintiff's delay.
B. Adequacy of Notice in Each Case
Other courts have recognized the second consideration of
American Pipe, and made a careful inquiry concerning whether
the defendant received notice of a subsequent plaintiff's claim
from the prior class suit. 28 The leading example of this approach is
McCarthy v. Kleindienst.27 It was uncertain in that case whether
the defendant had received adequate timely notice of the claims of

& n.6 (D.Md. 1974) (class "too amorphous"); Goldstein v. Regal Crest Inc., 62 F.R.D. 571,
576-80 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (common questions did not predominate).
23 See 414 U.S. at 554 ("This rule is in no way inconsistent with the
functional operation of a statute of limitations"); id. at 555 ("Since the imposition of a time bar would not in
this circumstance promote the purposes of the statute of limitations, the tolling rule we
establish here is consistent both with the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper function of the limitations statute"). See also Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of
Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REv. 591, 594-95 (1933) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted):
For limitation acts are not drafted in the shape of particularized enactments, narrow in
scope and employing language with reference to specific objectives of legislative policy.
.T. Ihe concepts are as a rule broad and embrace cases of such varied fact content
that they bear little relation to the policy factors which should govern the limitation of
actions.... This being the case, it is not surprising that courts, in applying the statutory formulas, should feel free to redefine them for the special purposes in hand, and
should not hesitate to read in "implied exceptions," independent of specific statutory
language and based on an assumed, though vaguely apprehended,policy behind limitation legislation.
24 414 U.S. at 554-55. Legislatures and courts have not clearly expressed what the real
function of a statute of limitations is. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv.L. Rv. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Statutes of Limitations]. The
basic goal seems to be the protection of the defendant, although this is expressed in several
different forms. The first variation of this theme is that the defendant would be substantially prejudiced in his defense of an ancient dispute. Because the evidence has been allowed
to grow stale and the defendant received no warning of the suit, so that he might act to
preserve evidence in his favor, he cannot present an adequate case. The second variation is
that the defendant can reach a state of repose deserving of protection. "There comes a time
when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean
of ancient obligations . . . ." Id.
26 Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944).
26 McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l
Bank, 526 F.2d 1083, 1097 (3d Cir. 1975).
27 562 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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some class members. The D.C. Circuit gave the trial court a broad
mandate to consider all the facts and circumstances in determining
the scope of notice given to the defendant.28
The problem with any careful inquiry into the notice question
is that it will involve the consideration of subtle factors. When the
court is to review all the circumstances of the case in determining
which claims should be allowed, the result will be difficult to predict. Anxious class members would file protective motions as a result. In short, a careful consideration of the notice question leads
to a violation of the "multiplicity" rule of American Pipe as it has
been interpreted by the lower courts.
C. Resolution
The answer to this dilemma lies in a more practical examination of each of the American Pipe criteria. As each criterion is
examined according to its actual effects, the two requirements of
American Pipe can be made compatible.
1. Multiplicity. The American Pipe Court said that a refusal
to toll the statute of limitations in the case before it would lead to
protective motions-spurious motions to join or intervene, solely
for protection from the statute of limitations-in subsequent class
suits. It is unclear which of two phenomena actually concerned the
Court. It may have been trying to prevent protective motions per
se. Protective motions are wasteful, and the Court at one point
characterized its tolling rule as necessary to avoid "needless duplication of motions.

'29

If this was the Court's concern, then Ameri-

can Pipe should be interpreted so as to avoid all unnecessary motions, and some courts have done so.s0

Alternatively, the Court may have been seeking to avoid a
"multiplicity of activity,"81 which the protective motions in that
s

We will not here attempt to delineate with precision or finality the extent to which

appellants should be permitted to intervene in this action. We think that this task is
better performed by the district judge, after he has received the view of the parties and
made further inquiry into the relationships between the claims of the named plaintiffs
and those of appellants. Once he has determined the breadth of the notice provided by
the class complaint and the degree to which defendants may have been prejudiced by
the timing of the motion for intervention, he can, if necessary, limit or condition appellants' rights of intervention.
Id. at 1275.
29

414 U.S. at 555.

30 See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 999,
1011-13 (D.D.C. 1978) (reading American Pipe to forbid duplicative suits).
31

414 U.S. at 551.
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case would have created. This goal would not require the prevention of all protective motions, but only the prevention of situations
in which substantially all class members file protective motions,
because such an occurrence would "deprive Rule 23 of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of
the procedure. 32 If all class members were to file protective motions, the suit would no longer be a class suit at all, but a joint suit
with every class member present in court. In other words, a multiplicity of activity would destroy the utility of the class action
device.
This second interpretation of American Pipe is more consistent with the overall rationale of the case. The Court's concern
throughout was the preservation of the class action device, not the
elimination of all wasteful motions. The Court had held earlier in
American Pipe that class members in a suit granted class certification after the statute of limitations had expired were protected
from the statute of limitations. Its reason for this rule was that
otherwise every class member would have to file a motion to join or
intervene to benefit from the class action. 3 It was using the same
rationale later when discussing class suits denied certification after
the running of the statute.3 4 The Court described this rule as
necessary for the preservation of the class action device.3 5 The
filing of a few protective motions does not threaten that procedure.
2. Notice. The notice issue may take two forms. In the first,
the defendant would assert that the class claim was incomprehensibly vague. He may have received notice of the named plaintiff's
claims within the statutory period, while having absolutely no idea
what sort of class he was opposing. The defendant would thus
claim that he was unable to determine "both the subject matter
and size of the prospective litigation"3 8 within the statutory period,
and accordingly did not receive notice adequate to justify tolling
the statute of limitations for any asserted class members. This
problem could arise if the named plaintiff made a vague allegation
of injury, and then claimed to sue on behalf of himself "and all
others similarly situated."
Such class claims will be rare, however. A number of federal

3"

Id. at 553.

" Id. at 551.
3

Id. at 553.

:5 Id. at 556.
' Id. at 555.
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district courts have adopted local rules requiring any class action
complaint to include detailed allegations of fact as to the size and
definition of the alleged class, and the common questions of law or
87
fact that unite the class.
The second notice problem would involve only some class
members. The complaint may assert a specific class, but some class
members subsequently may be revealed to have distinguishing
characteristics that would substantially affect the defendant's
case. 8 The defendant thus would assert that he had been surprised
by claims he was not prepared to defend against.
If courts should deny American Pipe tolling benefits to these
putative class members because elements of their claims varied significantly from that of the class, some protective motions would be
filed in subsequent class suits in which the statute of limitations
was about to expire. Asserted class members whose claims varied
in what might be significant ways from those of the rest of the
class would file protective motions to join or intervene, fearing that

3' Twenty-five districts have adopted such a rule. That of the Southern District of New
York is typical:
In any action sought to be maintained as a class action:
(b) The complaint (or other pleading asserting a claim for or against a class) shall
contain next after the jurisdictional grounds and under the separate heading 'Class
Action Allegations':
(2) Appropriate averments to justify such claim-including, but not necessarily
limited to,
(i) the number (or approximate number) of members of the class,
(ii) a description of the members of the class,
(iii) the basis upon which it is claimed that the party asserting the claim will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class, or, if the claim is asserted against a
class, that the named members of the class will fairly and adequately protect the interests of that class,
(iv) the questions of law or fact claimed to be common to the class, and
(v) in actions claimed to be maintainable as class actions under subdivision (b)(3)
of Fed R Civ P 23, averments to support the findings required by that subdivision,
including those noted under (A), (B), (C) and (D) of the subdivision.
S.D.N.Y. CIv. R. 11A. Accord, E.D. CAL. Civ. R. 124; S.D. CAL. Cirv. R. 200-4; D.D.C. Civ. R.
1-13; S.D. FLA. R. 19; N.D. FLA. R. 17; M.D. FLA. R. 4.04; N.D. GA. R. 220; S.D. GA. R. 14;
S.D. ILL. R. 28; S.D. Im. R. 7; E.D. L. R. 2.12; W.D.N.Y.R. 8; S.D. Omo R. 3.9; N.D. OHmo
R. ComPL.x LTGATION 3.01; D. ORE. R. 17; E.D. PA. R. 45; M.D. PA. R. 701.07; W.D. PA. &t
34; D.RI.R. 30; M.D. TENN. R 14; D. VT. R. 11; E.D. WASH. R. 7; W.D. WASH. Civ. R. 23.
38 For example, in McCarthy v. Kliendienst, 562 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the class
asserted was all those illegally arrested and maliciously prosecuted as a result of a political
demonstration. It subsequently appeared, however, that some of the class members had
been arrested under different conditions, which would require different types of evidence.
Id. at 1275. See text and note at note 28 supra.
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they might be denied American Pipe tolling benefits because the
defendant had no notice of their claims. These anxious class members would comprise small elements of the class, however. This
kind of notice problem would result in the filing of protective motions, not by the entire class, but by only a few members. The possibility of a few protective motions is not the "multiplicity of activity" that the American Pipe Court sought to avoid. 9
As a practical matter, then, the question of adequate notice to
the defendant will not come up very often. Even when it does
arise, it will affect only a few members of the asserted class.
3. Resolution. The two requirements of American Pipe thus
can be applied consistently. The courts should consider whether
the defendant had notice of the claims presented. This analysis
will involve the consideration of subtle factors, but the question
will arise in only a few cases, and it will affect only a few asserted
class members. As such, the notice question will not foster the
multiplicity of activity that concerned the Court.
H.
A.

THE PROPER METHOD OF TOLLING

Methods of Tolling

There are three ways in which a statute of limitations can be
"tolled": it can be postponed, suspended, or extended. 0 In cases of
fraud, where the plaintiff could not discover the fraud for some
time, or of fraudulent concealment by the defendant after the
cause of action arose, the limitation period is deemed not to have
begun running, that is, to be postponed, until the plaintiff reasonably could be expected to have discovered his injury.41 The statute
is suspended when the clock has begun to run, but is stopped as
long as some condition prevails, and will begin running again as
soon as that condition is lifted. An example of suspension occurs
when the defendant flees the jurisdiction. As soon as the defendant
returns, the statutory period begins to run again. 4' The period is
extended after the expiration of the normal period, if the plaintiff
is deemed to deserve an extra unit of time in which to bring his
action.
See text and notes at notes 29-35 supra.
See generally Statutes of Limitations, supra note 24, at 1220-37.
41 See generally Dawson, supra note 23; Statutes of Limitations, supra note 24, at
1210-22.
41 1 H. WOOD, LImTATION OF ACTONS 1070-1195 (4th ed. 1916); Statutes of Limitations, supra note 24, at 1222-34.
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The Supreme Court applied a form of extension in United
Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald.4 3 In that case asserted class members
sought to intervene after the entry of final judgment in the representative's individual action, in order to appeal the denial of class
certification. Although the statute of limitations had long since expired, the court held that asserted class members should be
granted a reasonable period of time after the entry of final judgment in which to intervene in order to appeal the denial of
certification.4 4
B.

American Pipe

The decision in McDonald to toll by extension may be contrasted with American Pipe'srule of suspension. In American Pipe

the Court reasoned by analogy from section 5(b) of the Clayton
Act,4" which tolls the statute of limitations for private antitrust
suits during the pendency of a federal government suit. Since that

statute "suspends" the limitation period during a government suit,
the Court reasoned, the period in this case should
be considered
46

suspended during the pendency of the class suit.
The Court's reading of section 5(b) of the Clayton Act was in-

correct, however. That section does not suspend the statutory
period during a government suit, but rather provides for extension. 47 The original section of the Act did provide for a simple sus432 U.S. 385 (1977).
Id. at 395-96.
15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1976); see note 47 infra.
414 U.S. at 561. It is not clear precisely what analogy the Court was drawing from the
Clayton Act. It may have been comparing antitrust class actions with government suits:
antitrust policy would be better enforced if asserted class members could await the results
of any class action, and reap all possible benefits from it, as they can now from a government suit. Alternatively, given its decision to toll the statute of limitations in class actions,
the Court might have been asking which form of tolling was most consistent with congressional policy; given such a choice, Congress has expressed a preference for suspension, when
a limitation period is to be tolled.
47 Whenever any civil or ciminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including an
action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of limitations in respect
of every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on
any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency
thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, however, That whenever the running of
the statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 of this
title is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever
barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years
after the cause of action accrued.
Clayton Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1976) (emphasis in original).
43
44
45
46
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pension of the limitation period during a government suit.48 In
1955, however, Congress amended that section, allowing the plaintiff one year after the termination of a government suit, or the normal four years after his cause of action arose, whichever is
greater.4 9 Congress felt that a simple suspension provision was

unjust:
There are many instances where the statute of limitations
as to a private cause of action may nearly have expired before
suit is instituted by the Government under the antitrust laws.
Although the statute is tolled during the pendency of the proceedings brought by the United States, the plaintiff in a
treble-damage action may find himself hard pressed to reap
the benefits of the Government suit if, upon its conclusion, he
has but a short time remaining to study the Government's
case, estimate his own damages, assess the strength and valid50
ity of his suit and prepare and file his own complaint.
C. Extension and Suspension in Class Suits
A hardship similar to that imposed on antitrust plaintiffs by
suspension can be visited upon asserted class members by American Pipe's suspension rule. In American Pipe itself, for example,
asserted class members had only eleven days5 1 in which to learn of
the denial of certification, 52 to decide whether the prospective individual recovery was worth the time and expense of filing such a
motion, and to take such action if appropriate.
The difficulty of the asserted class members' position is exac-

4' Whenever

any suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution is instituted by
the United States to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws,
the running of the statute of limitations in respect of each and every private right of
action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained
of in said suit or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof.

Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (amended 1955).
"

Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 2, 69 Stat. 283 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1976)).

6 S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955), reprinted in [1955] U.S. CODE
& AD. News 2328, 2332.
51 414 U.S. at 561.

CONG.

11 It is not reasonable to expect that asserted class members will be notified by the class
representative when class certification is denied, so that the asserted class members could
act to protect their interests. This did happen in American Pipe,see Utah v. American Pipe
& Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99, 100 (C.D. Cal. 1970), but the representative in that case was the
Utah state government, which had an independent duty to protect the interests of public
agencies in Utah. Furthermore, the representative notified only public agencies in Utah, and
none from other states. Thus, out of a class of approximately 350 members, as the trial court
described it, 49 F.R.D. at 21, the representative notified only 60 members.
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erbated by the possibility of appeals of the denial of class certification. A prompt motion to intervene would be unnecessary if the
representative should appeal, or if the class members could successfully appeal the denial of class certification after the entry of
final judgment."' As a result, class members need to consider these
additional factors when deciding whether to intervene within the
suspension period offered by American Pipe.
Because of these difficulties, the suspension rule of American
Pipe is inconsistent with the rationale of McDonald. The Court in
McDonald reasoned that, unless asserted class members were allowed a period of time to discover that the representative would
not appeal, asserted class members would move to intervene immediately after the denial of certification, in order to avoid the possibility that the representative might not appeal. The result would
be the multiplicity of motions in a class suit condemned by the
Court in American Pipe." Yet the suspension rule of American
Pipe undercuts this rationale. When the asserted class member is
given very little time to evaluate his situation-as can happen with
suspension-he must file a motion to intervene, although he might
have become convinced such a motion was unnecessary, had the
asserted class member had time to investigate the likelihood that
the representative would appeal, or the probability of winning an
appeal of the certification question on his own.
D.

Protection of Defendants

Congress further recognized that suspension could work unfairly against defendants as well. A simple suspension provision
could keep claims alive several years after the termination of a
53 If the representative should appeal the denial of certification and win, the class action will proceed without any problem with the statute of limitations because the reversal of
the denial of certification relates back to the filing of the complaint. Knable v. Wilson, 570
F.2d 957, 964 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 556 F.2d 699, 70102 (3d Cir. 1977). Even if the representative should appeal the denial of certification and

lose, the statute will continue to toll until the appeal is lost. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523
F.2d 689, 696 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). Thus, if the asserted class
members are convinced that the representative will appeal, they need not move promptly to

intervene, because the appeal will keep the statute tolling.
Further, the class members need not move to intervene within the American Pipe suspension period if they could successfully appeal the denial of certification themselves after
the entry of final judgment in the representative's individual suit. United Airlines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). If the class members should lose on appeal, however, they

will be barred by the statute of limitations from bringing individual suits.
5

432 U.S. at 394 n.15.
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protracted government suit. 5 This same unfairness in class suits is
exemplified by several cases applying American Pipe's suspension
rule. In these cases the lapse between filing and the certification
decision was several years, and the statutory period at the time of
suspension still had several years remaining. Plaintiffs could then
file suits as much as two years after the denial of certification,
claiming the tolling benefits of American Pipe.5 Under the simple
suspension provisions of American Pipe, these plaintiffs were protected. Yet nothing in the rationale of that case requires the protection of these plaintiffs. They obviously were not relying on the
class suit to protect their rights, and thus would not have filed protective motions to join or intervene had they not been protected by
the American Pipe tolling rule.
E.

Suspension As Opposed to Extension

Suspension is an arbitrary and inflexible method of tolling
that has no inherent attraction other than its simplicity in application. When the suspension ceases, the potential litigant has only
the time remaining in the original limitation period-the time left
when suspension was imposed-in which to act. This allowance of
time bears no relation at all to the needs of the litigant or the requirements of the case. Extension is a more logical and equitable
method of tolling because it does not depend on the amount of
time left over from the original limitation period: under extension
a court makes a new grant of time, regardless of how much of the
statutory period has expired. Tolling by extension can be tailored
to the needs of the parties in the individual case. For this reason
the courts should require plaintiffs claiming American Pipe tolling
benefits to do so within some reasonable time after the denial of
class action status.57
s S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955), reprinted in [1955] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2328, 2332-33.
See, e.g., Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035
(1978). The class suit remained pending for two years before class certification was denied.
Fifteen months after the entry of that order, and five months after the statutory period had
expired, some asserted class members filed separate suits, claiming American Pipe tolling
benefits.
6 The Supreme Court criticized judicial tolling by extension in Burnett v. New York

Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965). The plaintiff brought an FELA action in an Ohio state
court, and that court subsequently dismissed the suit for improper venue after the statute of
limitations had run. The Court held that the statute would be suspended during the pendency of the suit, and during the period until further appeals were either exhausted or timebarred. The Court reviewed and rejected other possible forms of tolling, concluding that
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METHODS OF CLAIMING TOLLING BENEFITS

The aspect of American Pipe that has generated the most con-

troversy concerns how the asserted class members may claim tolling benefits. Specifically, asserted class members may try to claim
such benefits by filing a separate suit, or by moving to join or intervene in the class representative's suit, which is now proceeding
as an individual claim. American Pipe is contradictory on this
point. The Court seems to have given two versions of its holding.
The first was narrow and extended tolling benefits only to those
asserted class members who moved to intervene in the suit, as the
plaintiffs in American Pipe had.58 There is a second, broader ver-

to toll the federal statute for a "reasonable time" after the state court orders the plaintiff's action dismissed would create uncertainty as to exactly when the limitation period
again begins to run. This uncertainty would be compounded by applying the equitable
doctrine of "laches". . . . Whether laches bars an action in a given case depends upon
the circumstances of that case and "is a question primarily addressed to the discretion
of the trial court." To apply it here would be at variance with the policies of certainty
and uniformity underlying this statute of limitations.
Id. at 435 (quoting Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30 (1951)). The Court thus apparently criticized extension by a reasonable time as uncertain and nonuniform.
Those criticisms are not relevant to the class action context. The Court's concern with
uniformity was based on the need for a uniform application of FELA. See 380 U.S. at 433.
That concern thus does not apply here. Also, the Court's concern over uncertainty in that
situation does not apply with equal force to class actions. In Burnett, tolling by suspension
produced none of the unfairness that occurs in the class action situation. There is no unfairness to the plaintiff. He needs only enough time to file a new suit in the proper court; he
does not need time to learn of his predicament, to evaluate his situation, and to decide on a
course of conduct. There was also less unfairness to the defendant in Burnett as a result of
suspension. The defendant was thoroughly aware of the one suit outstanding against him,
and knew that that suit would soon be brought in another court. Any unreasonable delay
allowed by suspension would not prejudice the defendant as severely. The defendant's only
uncertainty in a Burnett-type situation is when the one suit will be filed against him, and
not whether and how many suits will be filed against him, as is true in the class action
situation. In such a situation, therefore, the uncertainty of extension by a reasonable time
would appear as a significant drawback; in the class action situation, however, such uncertainty is unimportant when compared with the unfairness of suspension.
" We hold that in this posture, at least where class action status has been denied solely
because of failure to demonstrate that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable," the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to
intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.
414 U.S. at 552-53 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)). See also id. at 555
(emphasis added):
Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential
information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective
litigation, whether the actual trial is conducted in the form of a class action, as a joint
suit, or as a principalsuit with additionalintervenors.
Following this language, Professor Moore believes that American Pipe benefits only inter-
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sion of the Court's holding, however, which does not contain such a
restriction.
A.

Judicial Interpretations

Several courts, including the Second Circuit, have adopted the
more restrictive interpretation of American Pipe and allowed only
intervenors to claim tolling benefits. These courts have relied on
the "multiplicity" consideration of American Pipe.6 0 They read
that case to disapprove of all duplicative suits as contrary to the
purpose of rule 23. Because separate suits would be duplicative,
the purposes of American Pipe would not be furthered by granting
tolling benefits to these suits, and thus American Pipe's tolling
rule does not apply. 61
This rationale misapplies the "multiplicity" concept. The
Supreme Court's concern was not with protective motions per se,
but only with a vast number of them that would render the class
action superfluous. 62 It is one thing to seek to prevent a flurry of
protective motions that would destroy the efficacy of the class action device; it is quite another to insist that the smallest possible
number of suits be brought in resolving a dispute.
The other courts have not restricted tolling benefits to intervenors," and indeed there is nothing in the rationale of American

venors. 3B J. MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.90[3], at 23-555 n.16 (2d ed. 1976).
5 We are convinced that the rule most consistent with federal class action procedure
must be that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the
suit been permitted to continue as a class action.
414 U.S. at 554 (footnote omitted).
60 Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978),
Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Jefferson v. H.K. Porter Co., 485 F. Supp.
356, 360-61 (N.D. Ala. 1980); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
461 F. Supp. 999 (D.D.C. 1978).
61 Logically, these arguments could apply only to separate suits filed before the denial
of certification, although after the running of the statute of limitations. After class certification has been denied, a multiplicity of suits can do no harm to the class action device. The
Second Circuit has not so restricted its rule, however, but has also applied it to separate
suits filed after the denial of certification. Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
" See text and notes at notes 29-35 supra.
2 Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 997 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated,445 U.S.
940 (1980); McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 556 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1977); Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.28 (7th Cir. 1975); Peritz v. Liberty Loan
Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975); Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507,
513 & n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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Pipe to require such a restriction.6 4 The goals of preventing a multiplicity of motions and of adequate notice to the defendant draw
no distinction between separate suits and motions to intervene.
B.

The Case for Intervention

There nevertheless are reasons for requiring that all asserted
class members seeking to claim American Pipe tolling benefits
should file motions to intervene, rather than separate suits.
1. Reasonable time. It has already been argued in this comment that a simple suspension of the statutory period is unfair to
both plaintiffs and defendants, and that plaintiffs should be6 5afforded some reasonable time in which to claim tolling benefits. If
this proposal were adopted, however, and asserted class members
were to file separate suits, the court hearing the case would then
decide whether the suit was brought within a reasonable time after
the denial of class certification. If several suits, claiming tolling
benefits from the same class suit, were filed in various district
courts around the country, there would be a danger of inconsistent

64 See Class Actions, supra note 20, at 1449. Some cases draw support for their expansive reading of American Pipe from a footnote in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1977):
Petitioner also argues that class members will not opt out because the statute of
limitations has long since run out on the claims of all class members other than petitioner. This contention is disposed of by our recent decision in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), which established that the commencement
of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the
class.
Id. at 176 n.13. See Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 997 (5th Cir. 1978),
vacated, 445 U.S. 940 (1980); Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 n.5 (7th Cir.
1975).
The Eisen footnote does not bear on the question discussed in this comment-cases in
which class certification is denied after the running of the statute of limitations. In Eisen,
class certification had been granted, and the question was the protection of class members
who choose to opt out of the class action. With regard to the dual goals of American Pipenotice to the defendant and avoiding multiplicity-the Eisen situation presents a question
very different from that discussed in this comment. First, notice was not a question in Eisen. The American Pipe Court held that all class members are protected from the statute of
limitations when class certification is granted after the running of the statute. See note 4
supra. In so doing, the Court presumed that the defendant has received adequate notice in
such a case. See note 19 supra.
As to "multiplicity," whether class members may or may not opt out after the class is
certified should have no effect on the filing of protective motions to join or intervene before
the ruling on certification is made.
65See text and notes at notes 40-56 supra.
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decisions as to a reasonable length of time, a situation that would
be unfair. 6
It would be much simpler if all asserted class members seeking
tolling benefits were to file motions to intervene in the original
suit-the named plaintiff's claim, now stripped of its class action
character. The trial judge has discretion to deny any motions to
intervene that were not timely filed.6 7 Using this discretion, a
single judge hearing motions to intervene that claimed American
Pipe tolling benefits could decide whether those motions were filed
in a reasonable time. The judge would be familiar with the case,
and could make the most informed decision possible as to whether
the delay in filing a motion to intervene was reasonable in the
given instance.
2. Notice. When questions of adequate notice to the defendant do arise, a judge who is thoroughly familiar with the facts and
circumstances of the case could make decisions as to notice much
more easily. In addition, a judge hearing a suit with intervenors
has discretionary control over the issues and claims the intervenors
may present. As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence to
American Pipe,6 8 a judge hearing a suit with intervenors could use
his discretion to ensure that only those claims of which the defendant had timely notice would be presented.
CONCLUSION

American Pipe left open many questions concerning the vexing problem of suits denied class certification after the running of
the statute of limitations. The lower courts, in struggling with the
problem, often have failed to comprehend the Court's entire rationale, or have become entangled in American Pipe's confusing and
often contradictory language. This comment has dealt with three
of those resulting problems. A conflict in the dual goals of American Pipe, as interpreted by the lower courts, can be resolved
6" There might follow appeals from such inconsistent cases, with each losing party
pointing to the other case to prove an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The final result of
a number of such suits might be that the courts would come to agree on some fixed amount
of time for all cases involving American Pipe tolling benefits. This would not be a good
resolution of the problem, however. As with any arbitrary rule, such a fixed time period
inevitably would exclude some deserving plaintiffs, and grant tolling benefits to other plaintiffs who had delayed unreasonably. Efforts to "toll" this judicial statute of limitations
would result in still more appeals and wasted judicial resources.
"FED.
R. Cirv. P. 24(b).
414 U.S. at 561-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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through a closer reading of the rationale of that case, permitting
the vitality of the class action device to be preserved while ensuring adequate timely notice to the defendant. The Court's simple
suspension of the statute of limitations during the pendency of the
class suit is unfair to both plaintiffs and defendants. Finally, this
comment argues that. asserted class members wishing to claim
American Pipe tolling benefits should be required to intervene,
rather than be allowed to file separate suits. Perplexing questions
remain in the administration of class actions, but the proper application of the statute of limitations need not be one of them.
Charles F. Sawyer

